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THE NEW STANDARD OF OBSCENITY
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957)
The Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari to Roth and Alberts
who had been convicted under respective federal and state obscenity
statutes. Appellants contentions were two-fold: one, the statutes con-
stituted a per se encroachment of the guarantees of free speech and press
embraced in the First Amendment, and two, the jury instructions had
been unconstitutional as the clear and present danger test was not in-
cluded. The obscenity of the books, as such, was not a material issue in
the case although samples of the "stag" pictures and "filthy" comic books
had been submitted by the Justice Department and reviewed by the
Court. The Supreme Court determined initially that obscenity is not
within the area of constitutionally protected speech and press. In defining
obscenity, the Court held that material is obscene only when the work
as a whole, judged by contemporary standards, would appeal to an
average man's prurient interest.
The initial reaction to this decision is that it was a victory for those
who favor broad power3 of censorship. However, a closer analysis re-
veals quite the contrary.' Since the power to censor had always been
assumed, the Court's verbalization of this is by itself insignificant.
Rather, the real importance of the case arises from the "narrow definition
of obscenity that was authoritatively endorsed by the Court.
The classital definition can be found in Regina v. Hicklin2 where
the material was judged by its tendency to effect particularily susceptible
persons. This test, as initially interpreted, included an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that the author intended the consequences of his act,3 thereby
excluding praiseworthy intentions from the jury. The rule was adopted
in the United States in 1879," and continued to be a potent weapon of
"moralists" as late as the 1930's despite criticism from both intellectuals
and jurists.' The inherent evils of this unrestricted standard are best
illustrated in the Massachusetts case in which Theodore Dreiser's An
Anwr~can Tragedy was proscribed on the basis of a few isolated passages.
8
Even though the appellate court conceded that it possessed both "artistic
worth" and an "impelling moral lesson", they refused to overrule the
trial court's ruling that only the isolated passages need be submitted to
the jury.7
1 Lewis, Censorship Limited in "Obscenity" Cases, N.Y. Times, January 19,
1958, Sec. E., p. 9, col. 6.
2 Regina v. Hicklin, L.R. 3 Q.B. 360, 371 (1868): "Whether its tendency is
to deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands it may fall." Common law jurisdiction of this offense was
first assumed in Rex. v. Curl, 2 Str. 788, 93 Eng. Repr. 849 (K.B. 1727).
3 Steel v. Brannan, L.R. 7 C.P. 261, 267 (1872).
4 United States v. Bennett, 24 Fed. Cas. No. 14,571 (C.C.S.D. N.Y. 1879);
People v. Mueller, 96 N.Y. 408 (1896) ; but see In re Worthington, 30 N.Y. Supp.
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Led by the "dominant effect" test enunciated by the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals in the Ulysses case,' this strict application of the
Hicklin rule was curtailed in the early 1930's. Joyce's Ulysses had
also been assailed on the 'basis of a few isolated passages, but in dismissing
the contentions of the prosecution the court said that the matter is
obscene only when the publication "contains prohibited matter in such
quantity or of such a nature as to flavor the *hole and impart to the
whole any of the qualities mentioned in the statute, so the book as a
whole can fairly he described obscene." 9 In subsequent cases, Hicklin's
unrestricted frame of reference, "into whose hands it may fall" was
replaced by the "average mani" and "community standards of decency"
as part of the more liberal judicial attitude. 10
The Supreme Court made it quite clear in decisions handed down
in 1957 that a'n attempt to invoke the residual portions of the classical
standard would be incompatible with the First Amendment.1" Justice
Frankfurter, writing for the majority in Butler v. State of Michigan,'
held that a statute prohibiting the sale to the general public of a book
having a tendency to corrupt youth constituted an arbitrary restriction
of free speech."3 In the Roth decision, the Hicldin rule was explicitly
held unconstitutional because its "utilization might well encompass ma-
terial legitimately treating with sex.... 4 However, before formulating
a standard to replace Hicklin, it was necessary to dispose of the petitioner's
P
361 (Sup. Ct. 1894); St. Hubert Guild v. Quinn, 64 Misc. 336, 118 N.Y. Supp. 582
(1909), where the lower courts refused to follow the Hicklin rule in proceedings
against books of high literary merit.
5 See United States v. Kennerly, 209 Fed. 119 (S.D. N.Y. 1913), where
Judge Hand, although personally rejecting the test, felt constrained to follow it.
See ST. JOHN STEVAS, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW, Chapt. II (1956); and Lockhart
and McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity, and the Constitution, 38 MINN.
L. REv. 295 (1954), for a scholarly presentation of the criticisms of the test.'
6 Commonwealth v. Fried, 271 Mass. 318, 171 N.E. 472 (1930).
7Id. at 322, 171 N.E. at 474.
3 United States v. One Book Entitled "Ulysses", 72 F. 2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930).
9 id. at 707.
I°E.g., Walker v. Popenoe, 80 U.S. App. D.C. 129, 149 F. 2d 188 (1945);
Parmelee v. United States, 72 App. D.C. 203, 113 F. 2d 729 (1940) ; United States
v. Levine, 83 F. 2d 156 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. Dennett, 39 F. 2d 188
(2d Cir. 1930) ; American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Chicago, 3 Il1. 2d 334,
121 N.E. 2d 585 (1954); Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 381 Mass. 543, 62 N.E. 2d
840 (1945); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 66 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 101, affirmed sub
nom. Commonwealth v. Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A. 2d 389 (1949).
'1 U.S. CoNsT. amend. I, "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . ."; in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1952), this pro-
tection was extended to cover state action through the interpretation of "liberties"
in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
12352 U.S. 380 (1957).
131d. at 383, "The incidence of this enactment is to reduce the adult popula-
tion of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children."
14 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957).
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
contention that all censorship statutes are unconstitutional.' 5
A number of prior cases contained dicta in which no protection was
assumed.' 6 The most persuasive of these is Justice Murphy's analysis in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.'" In that case, it was concluded that
the "lewd and obscene" fall into those "narrowly limited classes of
speech the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought
to raise a constitutional question."
It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived
from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order
and morality.'"
This statement in Roth differs only grammatically from the ultimate
conclusions reached by Chafee in his study, Freedom of Speech. How-
ever, in Chafee's analysis, an "appeal to prurient interest" or absence of
"redeeming social importance" does not establish the necessary basis for
denying protection.' 9 In addition, to be obscene the words must:
...inflict a present injury upon the listeners, readers, or those
defamed, or else render highly probable an immediate breach
of the peace. . . . The only sound explanation of the punish-
ment of obscenity and profanity is that the words are criminal,
not because of the ideas they communicate, but like acts be-
cause of their immediate consequences to the five senses." 20
Whether this transformation of the words into acts is a necessary part
of a rational nexus for balancing public morals against freedom of
expression was the primary issue before the Court. Since all members
of the Court agreed that freedom of speech is not an absolute freedom,
the area of disagreement was necessarily limited to what constitutes the
proper test of obscenity.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, relied extensively on
the Chaplinsky dicta and concluded that a clear and present danger
is not necessary to exclude. Instead, he authoritatively endorsed the
15The petitioners contended that the statutes violated the due process re-
quirement of "definitness" as well as being repugnant to the First Amendment.
This argument will not be reviewed in this note; the Butler case, supra note 12,
had already clearly rejected this extension of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Foster, The "Comnstock Lode"--Obscenity and the Lawe, 48 J. CRI-a. L., C. & P.S.
245, 253 (1957).
161Beauharnasis v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1951); Winters v. New York,
333 U.S. 507 (1947); Hannigan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1945); Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1941); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1930);
Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281 (1896) ; United States v. Chase, 135 U.S.
255, 266 (1889) ; Ex parle Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736, 737 (1877).
17315 U.S. 568, 572 (1941).
IS Supra note 14, at 485.
19 CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH, 171 (1920). He rejected the interpretation of
constitutional intent and analogy to libel (two subordinate reasons utilized in
the Roth opinion) as an insufficient basis for exclusion.
20 Id. at 149-50.
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prurient interest test of the Model Penal Code.
Whether to the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards the dominant theme of the material taken as
a whole appeals to prurient interest.21
Although this is a narrower test than had been developed by
common law, it is significant that it assumes the premise that provocation
of mere thoughts is a sufficient criterion. The vitality of the endorsement
is further neutralized by the Court's approval of the lower court in-
structions which were framed in terms of the "tendency to corrupt"
standards developed by common law. This inconsistency is brought into
focus by a comparison of footnote twenty of the majority: "We perceive
no significant difference between the meaning of obscenity developed in
case law and the definition of the Model Penal Code," with the drafters'
comment: "We reject the prevailing tests of tendency to arouse . . .
because regulation of thought or desire, unconnected with overt behavior,
raises the most acute constitutional as well as practical difficulties." 2"
In the dissent of Justice Douglas, Justice Black concurring, the
position was taken that before speech is punishable, there must be some
relation to an overt action which can be penalized by the government.
Like the standard applied by the trial judges below, that stand-
ard [prurient interest] does not require any nexus between the
literature which is prohibited and action which the legislation
can regulate or prohibit.2"
Confronted with inadequate empirical evidence of any causal relation
between obscenity and social harm, together with the historical precedent
of irrational and indiscriminate censorship of obscenity, Justice Douglas
felt that "any test that turns on what is offensive to the community's
standards is too loose, too capricious, too destructive of freedom of ex-
pression to be squared with the First Amendment."2 4
Chief Justice Warren, who concurred in the majority's result so
21 MODEL PENAL CODE, Sec. 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6 1957).
22 Id. at p. 10.
23 Supra note 14, 513. This approach, is not dissimiliar from the one taken
by Judge Bok in 66 Pa. Dist. & Co. R. 101, affirmed sub nom. Commonwealth v.
Feigenbaum, 166 Pa. Super. 120, 70 A.2d 389 (1949): ". . . [O]nly when there is a
reasonable and demonstrable cause to believe that a crime or misdemeanor has
been committed or is about to be committed as a perceptible result of the publica-
tion and distribution of the writing in question." The Supreme Court's refusal
to approach the constitutional question in Doubleday & Co. v. New York, 355 U.S.
848 (1948), where the conviction of the publishing house was affirmed in a four-
four no opinion decision is felt by some critics to be the catalyst of Judge Bok's
bold step in analyzing obscenity in this framework. See MILTON R. KoNovrrz,
FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTIES OF A FREE PEOPLE, 159-160, 161 (1957); Lockhart and
McClure, Literature, the Law of Obscenity and the Constitution, 38 MINN. L. REV.
295 (1954).
24 Supra note 14 at 512, See Lockhart and McClure, ibid. at 385-86.
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far as the rejection of the clear and present danger test was concerned,
posited a third position in which the conduct of the individual is the
crucial element to be judged: "It is not the book that is on trial, it is the
person." 25
This approach seems the least tenable in that it fails to recognize
that the only acceptable basis for the exclusion is not the defendant's in-
sensitivity, but some adverse impact upon public morals. Chief Justice
Warren's difficulty is that he is treating a civil liberties crime in the
same manner in which ordinary criminal behavior has been traditionally
evaluated. If inquiry into the defendant's mental attitude has any
vitality, it is not as a nexus for the factual determination of obscenity,
but as a factor to be weighed in assessing the quantum of criminal re-
sponsibility to be imposed.
In subsequent cases the Supreme Court has adopted the same policy
with convictions under obscenity statutes as it had initially utilized in the
disposition of movie censorship litigation---a case-by-case basis in which
they personally review the allegedly obscene material.2" In two recent
memorandum opinions the Court reversed lower court convictions by a
mere citation of Roth.2 7 Likewise, in reviewing a Chicago ban on the
movie Game of Love, the Court abandoned its customary approach of
"too vague and indefinite" and reversed on the basis of Roth.2" In
essence, the decisions thus far indicate a reluctance on' the part of the
Court to tolerate censorship of any material which might express socially
significant ideas: As a practical matter, so long as this policy continues,
disposition in the majority of the cases will be the same as it would be
under the clear and present danger test. However, one should not be
oblivious of the fact that any test which is premised on thoughts pro-
voked, rather than overt acts induced, latently possesses all the seeds of
indiscriminate application that had prevailed under the Hkklin regime.
Although the explicit rejection of the Hicklin rule by the Roth
decision is a progressive step forward, the boldest step remains to be
taken. It seems elementary that the only acceptable standard is one in
which the determinative criteria is co-extensive with the basis for denying
25 Supra note 14 at 495.
2 6 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) ("sacreligious") ; Gelling v. Texas,
343 U.S. 960 (Per curiam, 1952) ("prejudicial to the best interests of people of
the city"); Superior Films Inc. v. Department of Education, 346 U.S. 587 (Per
curiam, 1954) ("harmful," "immoral" and "tend to corrupt morals").
27One, Inc., v. Olsen, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3203 (No. 290, Jan. 14, 1958), cert.
granted and mail ban on magazine which discussed the problems of homosexuality
reversed; Sunshine Book Co. v. Summerfield, 26 U.S.L. WEEK 3203 (No. 587, Jan.
15, 1957), cert. granted and postal ban of nudist magazine reversed.
28 Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, 355 U.S. 55 (Memo Dec.
1957) ; see also, Excelsior Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 3 N.Y. 2d 31, _. N.E. 2d --
(1957) ; where censorship of "Garden of Eden," a movie depicting life in a
nudist colony, was reversed on the basis of Roth.
19581
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the words the guarantees of the First Amendment.29 Until a reason
more satisfactory than Chaffee's analysis3" is presented, the clear and
present danger test seems to be the only standard which adequately
protects freedom of expression.
Charles E. Taylor
29 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937): "These rights may be abused
by using speech or press or assembly in order to incite to violence and crime.
The people through their legislatures may protect themselves from that abuse.
But the legislative intervention can find constitutional justification only by dealing
with the abuse. The rights themselves must not be curtailed." Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940): "Abridgment of the liberty of such discussion can
be justified only where the clear danger of substantive evil arises. . . ." Musser v.
Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948): "At the very least the line must be drawn between
advocacy and incitement."
30Supra note 19.
